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C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002437

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [ETTC](#) [UNSC](#) [IR](#) [KN](#) [RS](#)
SUBJECT: IRAN AND DPRK: IMPLEMENTING UN SANCTIONS
RESOLUTIONS

REF: A. STATE 67462
[1](#)B. MOSCOW 1535

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons: 1.4(B/D).

[1](#)1. (C) We discussed Russia's implementation of UNSCR 1737 and 1747 on May 24 with Vladimir Safronkov, Chief of the MFA's UN Political Affairs Section. Drawing from ref A, we urged that Russia take a broad definition of OP 5 of UNSCR 1747 regarding "arms and related materiel." Safronkov noted that the presidential decree implementing UNSCR 1737 and 1747 was still being considered in the GOR interagency, but noted that the definition of arms provided by the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List was a useful interpretive device. He said Moscow agreed that Iranian participation in arms fairs or trade shows to promote Iranian arms sales was inconsistent with UNSCR 1747.

[1](#)2. (C) Turning to the status of decrees implementing the DPRK and Iran sanctions resolutions, Safronkov said that the DPRK sanctions decree had made it through the interagency and was heading to the President's desk for signature "very soon." The Iran sanctions decree remained stuck in the interagency because of differences between the MFA and the Finance Ministry and Central Bank over language regarding asset freezes of proliferators. Safronkov explained that the draft DPRK sanctions decree included a "conceptual instruction" to the Russian interagency to resolve the proliferation financing issue quickly. He thought that the language from the DPRK sanctions decree might be incorporated in the Iran sanctions decree, but conceded that the Finance Ministry had not signed off on this compromise. The financial agencies remained concerned about enforcement procedures under Russian law and the legal implications for Russian banks and companies doing business with Iran.

[1](#)3. (C) Noting that this was a "delicate" issue, Safronkov said that consultations between representatives of the U.S. Treasury Department and the Russian Federal Financial Monitoring Service and Central Bank on proliferation finance had been useful in clarifying the challenges posed by the proliferation finance issues. He hoped these exchanges would continue because it helped focus GOR attention on the issue and could encourage the financial agencies to move forward in ways that helped Russia meet the obligations of the DPRK and Iran sanctions resolutions.
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